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INSTRUCTIONS.

1st. Murder is the unlawful killing of any person with malice aforethought.

2d. Murder is distinguished by the law of Virginia as murder in the first degree, and as murder in the second degree.

3d. Every homicide in Virginia is presumed in law to be murder in the second degree; in order to elevate the offence to murder in the first degree, the burden of proof is upon the Commonwealth; and to reduce the offence to manslaughter, the burden of proof is upon the prisoner.

4th. To constitute murder in the first degree the prisoner must have been incited to the killing by malice, and the killing must have been a wilful, deliberate and premeditated act on the part of the prisoner; that is to say, he must have willed, deliberated and premeditated that he should kill the deceased or do him some serious bodily injury, the necessary result of which would be his death, and from which he died.

5th. On a charge of murder malice is presumed from the fact of killing. When the killing is proved, and is unaccompanied with circumstances of palliation, the burden of disproving malice is thrown upon the accused.

6th. Whenever the killing is wilful, deliberate and premeditated, the law infers malice from this fact.

7th. The rule of law is that a man shall be taken to intend that which he does, or which is the necessary consequence of his act.

1st. Murder is the unlawful killing of any person with malice aforethought.

2d. Murder is distinguished by the law of Virginia as murder in the first degree, and as murder in the second degree.

Every homicide in Virginia is presumed to be murder in the second degree; in order to elevate the homicide to murder in the first degree, the burden of proof is upon the defendant; and to reduce the offense to manslaughter, the burden of proof is upon the prisoner.

3d. In distinguishing murder in the first degree the prisoner must have been indicted in the killing of a man, and the killing must have been a killing, deliberate and premeditated, and on the part of the prisoner; that is to say, he must have killed, deliberated and premeditated that he should kill the deceased or his name without deadly intent, the necessary result of which would be his death, and from which he died.

4th. In a charge of murder in the first degree the law of Virginia requires that the killing be proved, and is unnecessary with circumstances of malice, the burden of disproving malice is thrown upon the accused.

5th. However the killing is committed, deliberate and premeditated, the law infers malice from this fact.

6th. The rule of law is that a man shall be taken to intend that which he does, or which is the necessary consequence of his act.

The Court farther instructs the jury, as a matter of definition, that every unlawful homicide must be either murder or manslaughter, and whether it be one or the other depends upon the means by which it was accomplished and on whether the party who perpetrated it did it with malice or not. If the act was done with a deadly weapon, or by means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm, and with malice, it is murder. If done in the heat of a sudden passion arising on a sufficient provocation, or in the heat of mutual combat, it is voluntary manslaughter. If it be done in the commission of an unlawful act not felonious, by a means not likely and not intended to cause death or great bodily harm, it is involuntary manslaughter.

A homicide committed in self defense, or in defense of a near relation, under circumstances justifying that plea, is not an unlawful homicide but a justifiable homicide, and the perpetrator of the act is not guilty of any crime.

Murder of the first degree is murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or any wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or murder done, in the commission of, or attempt to commit arson, rape, robbery or burglary.

All other murder is murder of the second degree.

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The court further instructs the jury that to constitute a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing it is not necessary that the intention to kill should exist any particular length of time prior to the actual killing. It is only necessary that such intention should come into existence for the first time at the time of killing, or any time previously.

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The court further instructs the jury that a mortal wound given with a deadly weapon in the previous possession of the slayer, without any provocation, or even with slight provocation, is prima facie, wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, and throws upon the prisoner the necessity of showing extenuating circumstances.

The court further instructed the jury that to constitute
premeditation, the defendant must have formed the intent
to kill at some time prior to the actual killing. It is not necessary
that the intention to kill should exist any particular length of
time prior to the actual killing. It is only necessary that such
intention should come into existence for the first time at the
time of killing, or any time previously.

The court further instructed the jury that a killing
committed with a deadly weapon in the presence of a person is
murder, without any provocation, or even with slight provocation,
if the killing is premeditated, deliberate, and premeditated killing,
three upon the prisoner the necessity of showing extenuating
circumstances.

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The court instructs the jury that the credibility of witnesses is a question exclusively for the jury, and the law is that where a number of witnesses testify directly opposite to each other, the jury is not bound to regard the weight of the evidence as equally balanced; the jury have the right to determine from the appearance of the witnesses on the stand, their manner of testifying, and their apparent candor and fairness, their apparent intelligence, and from all the other surrounding circumstances appearing on the trial, which witnesses are more worthy of credit, and to give credit accordingly.

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The court instructs the jury that the credibility of witnesses is a question exclusively for the jury and the law is that where a number of witnesses testify directly opposite to each other, the jury is not bound to regard the weight of the evidence as equally balanced; the jury have the right to determine the relative appearance of the witnesses on the stand, their manner of testifying, and their general conduct and bearing; and in all such cases, the jury are to give credit according to the weight of the evidence, and to give credit according to the weight of the evidence, and to give credit according to the weight of the evidence.

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The court instructs the jury that to make out a case of self-defense in a case of homicide, the accused must show to the jury that the defense was necessary to protect his own life, or to protect himself against greivous bodily harm;.

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The court instructed the jury that to make out a case of self-
defense in a case of homicide, the accused must show to the jury
that the balance was such as to protect his life, or to pro-
tect himself against grievous bodily injury.

The Court further instructs the jury that circumstantial evidence is legal and competent in criminal cases, and if it is of such a character as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that the defendant is guilty is entitled to the same weight as direct testimony. But where any material fact is dependent on circumstantial evidence it is the duty of the jury to weigh such evidence with the greatest caution.

The Court further instructs the jury that circumstantial

evidence is found and considered in criminal cases, and it is

in all such a character as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis

other than that the defendant is guilty is entitled to the same

weight as direct testimony. But when any evidence

is introduced in circumstantial evidence

it is to be held to the fact that it is

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The Court instructs the jury that a reasonable doubt is such a doubt as may be honestly and reasonably entertained as to ^{some} substantial and material fact essential to prove the offence charged. A reasonable doubt must be based upon the evidence or be ^{such} based as is suggested by the evidence, or grows out of the evidence itself, or out of the lack of evidence. It must not be arbitrary doubt. It must be serious and substantial in order to warrant an acquittal. It must be a doubt of material fact or facts necessary for the jury to believe to find a verdict of conviction, and not of immaterial and non-essential circumstances.

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The Court instructs the jury that a reasonable doubt is such a doubt as may be honestly and reasonably entertained as to substantial and material fact essential to prove the offense charged. A reasonable doubt must be based upon the evidence or be based as is suggested by the evidence, or grow out of the evidence itself, or out of the lack of evidence. It must not be arbitrary doubt. It must be serious and substantial in order to warrant an acquittal. It must be a doubt of material fact or facts necessary for the jury to believe to find a verdict of conviction, and not of immaterial and non-essential circumstances.

The Court instructs the jury that in this case, as in all criminal cases, the accused's plea of not guilty raises a presumption of innocence in his favor and puts on the Commonwealth the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If therefore, upon a consideration of the whole case, the testimony of the witnesses and the circumstances shown in evidence, there exists in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, they should find him not guilty.

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If therefore, upon a consideration of the whole case, the tes-
timony of the witnesses and the circumstances shown in evidence,
there exists in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as
to the guilt of the accused, they should find him not guilty.

The Court instructs the jury that men, when threatened with danger, must determine from the state of things surrounding them as to the necessity of resorting to self-defense and if they act reasonably and with honest convictions, they will not be held responsible criminally for a mistake as to the extent of the actual danger.

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and especially the fact that they will not be
held responsible for a crime in the event of
the crime.

The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that, the accused, after he had obtained his traps from the deceased was walking away from the deceased, and, as he did so, saw Frazier raising his gun as if intending to shoot, and the jury believe from the evidence that Frazier's actions were such as were reasonably calculated to excite in the mind of the accused the belief that Frazier intended shooting the accused or his brother and that the accused did so believe and fired the fatal shot under the reasonable belief that it was necessary to shoot to protect himself and his brother from death or serious bodily harm then they should find the accused not guilty, for ~~as~~ A man has the right to defend himself or his brother from death or serious bodily harm by such means as may be necessary to that end, even to the taking of the life of the assailant, if that be necessary to an adequate defense.

The Court instructs the jury that, if they believe from the evidence that at the time the deceased received his fatal wound, the accused was under reasonable apprehension from the conduct, words and actions of the deceased, as they appeared to him at the time, that the deceased designed or intended to kill the accused or his brother, or do them some serious bodily harm and was also under a reasonable apprehension that there was immediate danger of the deceased carrying this purpose into execution, you should find the accused not guilty; and the court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence the accused acted under reasonable apprehension as aforesaid, you should find him still not guilty, even though you should believe from the evidence that it turned out after the killing that the danger was apparent and not real; in other words, that the appearances were deceptive and there was in fact no purpose on the part of the deceased to kill the accused or his brother, or do them serious bodily harm. The enquiry is not whether the harm apprehended was actually intended by Praxier, but did it appear actual and real to the accused as a reasonable man. (See Campbell case, cited in Stoneham's case, 25 Gratt. Harrigan vs. Thompson, page 285; Parrish case, 61 Va. 15; Wharton, page 460; Parrish case, 61 Va. Drysdale vs. Georgia, 6 L. R. A. 484 and note. Wharton, both rules, 1-455, 459 best rule as amended.)

~~See Campbell Case 75 Va. 116~~

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The Court instructs the jury that, if they believe from the evidence that at the time the deceased received his fatal wound, the accused was under reasonable apprehension from the conduct, words and actions of the deceased, as they appeared to him at the time, that the deceased designed or intended to kill the accused or his brother, or do them some serious bodily harm and was also under a reasonable apprehension that there was immediate danger of the deceased carrying this purpose into execution, you should find the accused not guilty; and the court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence the accused acted under reasonable apprehension as aforesaid, you should find him still not guilty, even though you should believe from the evidence that it turned out after the killing that the danger was apparent and not real; in other words, that the apprehensions were deceptive and there was in fact no purpose on the part of the deceased to kill the accused or his brother, or do them serious bodily harm. The enquiry is not whether the harm apprehended was actually intended by the accused, but did it appear actual and real to the accused as a reasonable man. (See People v. ... cited in ... case, 81 Cal. 2d 484 and ... case, 145 Cal. 488, 489 (1928).)

The Court instructs the jury, that the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove every fact or circumstance necessary to convict the accused of ^{any} ~~every~~ offence whatever, and if they have any reasonable doubt as to any fact or circumstance necessary to convict the accused as aforesaid, they are bound to give him the benefit of such doubt and find him not guilty and the court tells the jury that a reasonable doubt is, "that state of the case, which after the entire comparison and consideration of all of the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say that they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge. ~~Kibler's Case, 24 Va. 313.~~

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The Court instructs the jury, that the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove every fact or circumstance necessary to convict the accused of every offense whatever, and if they have any reasonable doubt as to any fact or circumstance necessary to convict the accused as aforesaid, they are bound to give him the benefit of such doubt and find him not guilty and the court tells the jury that a reasonable doubt is, "that state of the case, which after the entire comparison and consideration of all of the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say that they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge."

The Court instructs the jury that if they have a reasonable doubt as to the grade of offence of which the prisoner may be guilty, that they shall resolve that doubt in his favor, and find him guilty of the lower grade; to illustrate if they have reasonable doubt as to whether he is guilty of murder in the first degree or the second degree, they should find him guilty in the second degree. If they have reasonable doubt as to whether he is guilty of murder in the second degree or manslaughter, they should find him guilty of manslaughter, and if they have a reasonable doubt as to whether he be guilty at all, they must resolve that doubt in favor of the accused and acquit him. ~~Litter's~~ Case, 101 Va. 350. See 81007a.

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The Court instructs the jury that if they have a reasonable doubt as to the grade of offense of which the prisoner may be guilty, that they shall resolve that doubt in his favor, and that his guilt of the lower grade; to illustrate it they have reasonable doubt as to whether he is guilty of murder in the first degree or the second degree, they should find his guilt in the second degree. If they have reasonable doubt as to whether he is guilty of murder in the second degree or manslaughter, they should find his guilt of manslaughter, and if they have a reasonable doubt as to whether he is guilty at all, they must resolve that doubt in favor of the accused and acquit him.

~~Section 1117. Sec. 1117.~~

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Sub. Prisoner

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The Court instructs the jury that, in this case the law raises no presumption against the prisoner, but every presumption of law is in favor of innocence; he rests secure in that presumption until proof is adduced which establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and, in order to convict him, every material fact necessary to constitute the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and, if the jury entertain any reasonable doubt upon any single fact, or element, necessary to constitute the crime, it is the jury's duty to give the prisoner the benefit of such doubt and acquit him.

2nd Page

The Court instructs the jury that, in every case the law raises no presumption against the prisoner, but every presumption of law is in favor of innocence; no facts occur in that presumption until proof is adduced which establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and, in order to convict him, every element that necessary to constitute the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and, if the jury entertain any reasonable doubt upon any single fact, or element, necessary to constitute the crime, it is the judge's duty to give the prisoner the benefit of such doubt and acquit him.

The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that, the accused, after he had obtained his traps from the deceased was walking away from the deceased,

and, as he did so, saw Frazier raising his gun as if intending to shoot, and Frazier's actions were such as it appeared to the accused that Frazier intended shooting the accused or his brother and

kill him or his brother, or do him or his brother serious bodily

harm, then the accused, under these circumstances was justified

in shooting the deceased and he must be acquitted.

Then they should find the accused not guilty, for one has the right to defend himself or his brother from death or serious bodily harm by such means as may be necessary to that end, even to the taking of the life of the assailant, if that be necessary to an adequate defence.

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The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the accused, after he had obtained his train from the deceased was waiting away from the deceased, and he did so, saw Frasier raising his gun as if intending to shoot, and Frasier's actions were such as it appeared to the accused that Frasier intended shooting the accused or his brother and kill him or his brother, or do him or his brother serious bodily harm, then the accused, under these circumstances was justified in shooting the deceased and he must be acquitted.

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The Court instructs the jury that men, when threatened with danger, must determine from the state of things surrounding them as to the necessity of resorting to self-defense and if they act ^{reasonably and upon} ~~from reasonable~~ and honest convictions, they will not be held responsible criminally for a mistake as to the extent of the actual danger.

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The Court instructs the jury that when
 threatened with danger, must determine from the state of things
 surrounding them as to the necessity of resorting to self-defense
 and if they act reasonably and honestly, they will
 not be held responsible criminally for a mistake as to the ex-
 tent of the actual danger.

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Report

The Court instructs the jury, that in criminal trials, the party accused is entitled to the benefit of the legal presumption in favor of innocence, which in doubtful cases is always sufficient to turn the scale in his favor. It is therefore a rule of criminal law, that the guilt of the accused must be fully proved. Neither a mere preponderance of evidence nor any weight of preponderant evidence is sufficient for the purpose, unless it generate full belief of the fact to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt. Kibler's Case, 94 Va. 813.

Page

The Court instructs the jury, that in criminal trials, the party accused is entitled to the benefit of the legal presumption in favor of innocence, which in doubtful cases is always sufficient to turn the scale in his favor. It is therefore a rule of criminal law, that the guilt of the accused must be fully proved. Neither a mere preponderance of evidence nor any weight of preponderant evidence is sufficient for the purpose, unless it generates full belief of the fact to the exclusion of all reason-

this Court. Kipper's Case, 94 Va. 813.

Revised

The Court instructs the jury that upon the trial of a criminal case by a jury, the law contemplates a concurrence of twelve minds in the conclusion of guilt before a conviction can be had. Not only is this true with respect to the guilt of the accused, but it is likewise true with respect to the degree of crime. Therefore, although the jury may believe from the evidence, that the accused is guilty of the killing of the deceased, still, if any individual member of the jury, after having duly considered all of the evidence in this case, and after consultation with his fellow jurors, should entertain a reasonable doubt as to the degree of the guilt of the accused, it is his duty not to surrender his own convictions as to such degree of guilt simply because the balance of the jury entertain different convictions with respect to such degree.

Page 2

The Court instructs the jury that upon the trial of a criminal case by a jury, the law contemplates a concurrence of twelve minds in the commission of guilt before a conviction can be had. Not only is this true with respect to the guilt of the accused, but it is likewise true with respect to the degree of crime. Therefore, although the jury may believe from the evidence, that the accused is guilty of the killing of the deceased, still, if any individual member of the jury, after having duly considered all of the evidence in this case, and after consultation with his fellow jurors, should entertain a reasonable doubt as to the degree of the guilt of the accused, it is his duty not to surrender his own conviction as to such degree of guilt simply because the balance of the jury entertain different convictions with respect to such degree.

Revised

The Court further instructs the jury that circumstances of suspicion, no matter how grave or strong, are not proof of guilt, and that the accused must be found not guilty unless the fact of his guilt is proven beyond every reasonable doubt to the actual exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of his innocence consistent with the fact proven. Henderson's case, 98 Va. 798.

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proof of guilt, and that the accused must be found not guilty
unless the fact of his guilt is proven beyond every reasonable
doubt to the actual exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of
his innocence consistent with the fact proven. Henderson's

case, 98 Va. 732.

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Report

The Court instructs the jury that though they believe from the evidence that Charles Marshall made threats against Buck Frazier previous to the shooting of Frazier by the accused, yet such threats if made in the absence of the accused and without his knowledge cannot be considered as to the truth of the crime charged against Breinard Marshall.

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W. J. ...

The Court instructs the jury that though they believe from the evidence that Charles Marshall made threats against Jack Wheeler previous to the shooting of Wheeler by the accused, yet such threats if made in the absence of the accused and without his knowledge cannot be considered as to the truth of the crime charged against Bernard Marshall.

Substitute

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Revised

The Court instructs the jury that man slaughter is when a person feloniously, ^{and} unlawfully and without malice kills another, and it is divided into two classes;

Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice, in ^a sudden ~~passion~~ ^{fight} and ~~the~~ heat of blood.

Involuntary manslaughter is when one in the performance of an unlawful act kills another without design.

Page

11

The Court instructs the jury that an assault
 is when a person feloniously ^{and} unlawfully and without malice kills
 another, and it is divided into two classes;
 Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing
 of another without malice, in sudden passion and without heat of
 blood.
 Involuntary manslaughter is when one in the
 performance of an unlawful act kills another without design.

Revised

The Court instructs the jury that the burden of proof is on the Commonwealth to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every essential ingredient necessary to constitute the offence charged in the indictment, and if the jury from the evidence have any doubt as to the guilt of the accused, then evidence of his good reputation may be allowed to resolve the doubt in his favor. See Wadley's Case, 98 Va. 810, and Vaughan's Case, 85 Va. 672.

Court advised Council in reviewing this instruction that they were at liberty to give the force of good reputation - that the action of the Court in refusing this instruction was not intended to deny them that privilege. The full extent stated in the instruction -

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The Court instructs the jury that the burden of proof is on the Commonwealth to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every essential ingredient necessary to constitute the offense charged in the indictment, and if the jury from the evidence have any doubt as to the guilt of the accused, then evidence of his good reputation may be allowed to remove the doubt in his favor. See *Walley's Case*, 25 Va. 510, and *Wentham's Case*, 28 Va. 572.

Confession of Guilt in Reference to the Indictment that the same is being made for the purpose of the Court in the framing this indictment was returned to bring their trial forward. The fact of their guilt is the substance.

Revised?

The Court instructs the jury that where any fact essential to the conviction of the accused is dependent on circumstantial evidence it is the duty of the jury to act upon such evidence with the utmost caution.

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The Court instructs the jury that where any fact essential to the conviction of the accused is dependent on circumstantial evidence it is the duty of the jury to not upon such evidence with the least caution.

Examined by
Wm. H. ...
John ...
...

Wm.

Reasonable

The court further instructs the jury that circumstantial evidence is legal and competent in criminal cases, and if it is of such a character as to exclude every hypothesis other than that the defendant is guilty is entitled to the same weight as direct testimony.

The court further instructed the jury that circumstantial
evidence is legal and competent in criminal cases and that
of such a character as to exclude every hypothesis other than that
the defendant is guilty is entitled to the same weight as direct
evidence.

substantial and material fact essential to prove the offense charged.

The court instructs the jury that a reasonable doubt is such a doubt as may be honestly and reasonably entertained as to charged. A reasonable doubt must be based upon the evidence, ~~by~~ ^{each} substantial and material fact essential to prove the offense or ~~that~~ ^{as} is suggested by the evidence, or grows out of the evidence itself. It must not be arbitrary doubt, without evidence to sustain it. It must be serious and substantial in order to warrant an acquittal. It must be a doubt of material fact or facts necessary for the jury to believe to find a verdict of conviction, and not of immaterial and non-essential circumstances.

lack of the
evidence
competent

Com. Marshall

Com's Mandate (S.M.)

... to have the opinion
of the jury.

The court instructed the jury that a reasonable doubt is such a doubt as may be honestly and reasonably entertained as to the guilt of the accused. A reasonable doubt must be based upon the evidence, and is a doubt that is not based upon the evidence or is based upon the evidence, or grows out of the evidence. It must not be arbitrary doubt. It must be based upon the evidence and not upon the evidence. It must be a doubt of material fact or law. It is necessary for the jury to believe that a verdict of conviction and not of acquittal and non-essential circumstances.

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The court instructs the jury that to make out a case of self-defence in a case of homicide, the accused must show to the jury that the defence was necessary to protect his own life, or to protect himself against grievous bodily harm; and that ~~with regard to the necessity that will justify the slaying of another in self-defence, the accused must not have wrongfully occasioned the necessity, for a man shall not in any case justify the killing of another by a pretence of necessity, unless he were without fault in bringing that necessity upon himself.~~

Instructions appended
by Genl.

INSTRUCTION NO. _____

The Court instructs the jury that it is a principle of criminal law that where death ensues on a sudden provocation, or sudden quarrel, without malice prepense, the killing is manslaughter, and in order to reduce the offence to killing in self-defence, the accused must prove two things, viz: (1) That before the mortal blow was given, he declined further combat, and retreated as far as he could with safety; and (2) that he killed the deceased through the necessity of preserving his own life, or that there was reasonable ground to believe that the killing was necessary to preserve his own life, or to save himself from great bodily harm."

Clerk's case, 90 Va., 360.

INSTRUCTION NO. _____

The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the prisoner assailed the deceased and a combat ensued, and in such combat the prisoner killed the deceased, and if they shall further believe that the first assault was made by the prisoner upon the deceased with a preconceived design to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, then the malice of the first assault, notwithstanding the violence with which it was returned, communicates itself to the last act of the prisoner and the killing is murder.

Jackson's case, 97 Va., 762.

INSTRUCTION NO. _____

The Court instructs the jury that it is a principle of
criminal law that where death occurs in a sudden prosecution,
sudden assault, without malice prepense, the killing is man-
slaughter, and in order to reduce the offense to killing in self-
defense, the accused must prove two things, viz: (1) that before
the mortal blow was given, he believed further death, and re-
sisted as far as he could with safety; and (2) that he killed the
accused through the necessity of preserving his own life, or that
there was reason to believe that the killing was neces-
sary to preserve his own life, or to save himself from great bodily

Clark's case, 97 Va., 366.

INSTRUCTION NO. _____

The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the
evidence that the prisoner assailed the deceased and a combat
ensued, and in such combat the prisoner killed the deceased, and
if they shall further believe that the first assault was made by
the prisoner upon the deceased with a premeditated design to kill
or to inflict great bodily harm, then the malice of the first
assault, notwithstanding the violence with which it was returned,
constitutes itself to the last act of the prisoner and the killing
is murder.

Johnson's case, 97 Va., 368.

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Notes

The court instructs the jury, as a matter of law, in considering the case, the jury are not to go beyond the evidence to hunt up doubts, nor must they entertain such doubts as are merely chimerical or conjectural. A doubt to justify an acquittal must be a reasonable doubt, and it must arise from a candid and impartial investigation of all the evidence in the case, and unless it is such that were the same kind of doubt interposed in the graver transactions of life it would cause a reasonable and prudent man to hesitate and pause, it is insufficient to authorize a verdict of not guilty. If, after considering all the evidence you can say that you have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, you are satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the jury must not go beyond the evidence to hunt up inferences of guilt.

The court instructs the jury that on a charge of murder malice is presumed from the fact of killing. When the killing is proved, and is unaccompanied with circumstances of palliation, the burden of disproving malice is thrown upon the accused.

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The court instructed the jury that in considering the case, the jury are not to be guided by evidence to find on details, but that they should consider such details as are clearly established or undisputed. A doubt as to the truth of any detail must be a reasonable doubt, and it must arise from the facts and investigation of all the evidence in the case. Several things to which you will refer are of great importance and unless it is such that you are sure of its truth, you should not be swayed by any impression of its truth. In the event of a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any detail, you should acquit the defendant. It is important to note that the evidence in this case is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. You are instructed to acquit the defendant if you have any doubt as to the truth of any detail. The evidence in this case is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. You are instructed to acquit the defendant if you have any doubt as to the truth of any detail.

The court instructed the jury that on a charge of murder, the jury is presumed from the fact of killing, when the killing is proved, and in unaccompanied with circumstances of mitigation, the burden of disproving malice is thrown upon the accused.

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The court further instructs the jury that in determining the weight to be given the testimony of different witnesses in this case, the jury are authorized to consider the relationship of the witnesses to the parties; ~~if the case is proved~~; their interest, if any, in the result of ~~the~~ case; their temper, feeling or bias, if any has been shown; their demeanor while testifying; their apparent intelligence; their means of information; and to give such credit to the testimony of ~~the~~ witnesses as under all the circumstances ~~such witnesses~~ seem to be entitled to.

They

to court further inquire the jury that in determining
the weight to be given the testimony of different witnesses in
this case the jury are authorized to consider the relationship of
the witnesses to the witness whose evidence is given; their interest
in the subject; their character; their position; their age; their
education; their habits; their demeanor; their testimony;
of any other facts of interest; and
It is the duty of the jury to give such weight
to the testimony of each witness as under
the circumstances and evidence then to be entitled to

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The court instructs the jury that whoever kills a human being with malice aforethought is guilty of murder; that a murder which is perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing is murder in the first degree.

the court instructed the jury that whoever kills
another being with malice aforethought is guilty of murder; that a
murder which is perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other
kind of willful, calculated, and premeditated killing is murder in
the first degree.

2

The court instructs the jury that murder is distinguished by the law in Virginia as murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree.

The court instructed the jury that murder is distinguished
by the law in Virginia as murder in the first degree and murder
in the second degree.

The court instructs the jury that the rule of law is that a man shall be taken to intend that which he does, or which is a necessary consequence of his acts.

The court further instructs the jury that whenever the killing is wilful, deliberate, and premeditated, the law infers malice from this fact.

The court instructs the jury that every homicide in Virginia is presumed to be murder in the second degree. In order to elevate the offence to murder in the first degree, the burden of proof is upon the Commonwealth, and to reduce the offence to manslaughter, the burden of proof is upon the prisoner.

100-1000

Brain Market

Com's Instruction

Response 2, Ground

of the 1st of Dec.

Reference 2


It is a matter of fact that the trial of law is
not a matter of fact, but a matter of opinion, or which
is a matter of opinion, and which is a matter of opinion.

The court further instructs the jury that whenever the
evidence is sufficient, deliberate, and premeditated, the law infers
malice from this fact.

The court instructs the jury that every homicide is
murder, unless it is committed in the heat of passion, in order
to avenge the death of another, or in the heat of passion, the
murder is not murder, and is not murder, and is not murder, and
is not murder, and is not murder, and is not murder, and is not murder.

He to prove find the presence
of the substance mentioned
and for his punishment to
one year in the penitentiary.

J. L. Litch, Governor



2 1/2


100 ft

Defendant's Exhibit

Conrad

Marshall

MORRIS & HART
 SPECIAL AGENTS
 ROANOKE, VA



Commonwealth

1895 -

Board of Marshals

- 1 D. H. Atchison
- 2 J. L. Lutz
- 3 J. W. R. Showalter
- 4 H. C. Rivercomb
- 5 Chas. H. Chandler
- 6 W. J. Rexroad
- 7 E. M. Bowman
- 8 F. H. Lister
- 9 G. S. Kraun
- 10 F. W. Jones
- 11 Geo. W. Howe
- 12 J. J. Hunter

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Handwritten text on the first line of the page.

- 1. ...
- 2. ...
- 3. ...
- 4. ...
- 5. ...
- 6. ...
- 7. ...
- 8. ...
- 9. ...
- 10. ...

If you find him not guilty you shall say so and no more.

If you find him guilty of murder in the first degree you shall say so and then ascertain his punishment by death or by confinement in the penitentiary for life. ~~you shall find him~~
~~guilty of murder in the first degree and say so and say so.~~

If you find him guilty of murder in the second degree you shall say so and then ascertain his punishment by confinement in the penitentiary so that such confinement shall not be less than five nor more than eighteen years.

If you find him not guilty of either of the aforesaid felonies but guilty of voluntary manslaughter you shall say so and then ascertain his punishment by confinement in the penitentiary so that such confinement shall not be less than one nor more than five years.

If you find him not guilty of ^{any} ~~any~~ of the aforesaid felonies but guilty of involuntary manslaughter you shall say so and then ascertain his punishment by fine or by confinement in jail or by both so that such fine be not less than five dollars.

If you find his not guilty you shall say so and so

more.

If you find his guilty of murder in the first degree
you shall say so and then ascertain his punishment by death or
life imprisonment in the penitentiary for life.

If you find his guilty of murder in the second degree
you shall say so and then ascertain his punishment by confinement
in the penitentiary so that such confinement shall not be
less than five nor more than fifteen years.

If you find his not guilty of either of the above
felonies but guilty of voluntary manslaughter you shall say so and
then ascertain his punishment by confinement in the penitentiary
so that such confinement shall not be less than one nor more than
five years.

If you find his not guilty of either of the above
felonies but guilty of involuntary manslaughter you shall say so
and then ascertain his punishment by confinement in the
penitentiary so that such time be not less than five years.

601

vs

Brainard Marshall



COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

Commonwealth COUNTY OF ROCKINGHAM, to-wit:

In the Circuit Court of said County:

The Jurors of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in and for the body of the County of Rockingham, and now attending the Circuit Court of said County, at its March term, 1917, upon their oaths present, that Brainerd Marshall on the twenty-fifth day of March in the year 1917, in the said County, with force and arms, in and upon the body of one Noah Frazier, in the peace of the said Commonwealth then and there being, feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault; and that the said Brainerd Marshall a certain gun, a Winchester repeating rifle, then and there loaded with gunpowder and leaden bullet, which said gun, he, the said Brainerd Marshall in his hands then and there had and held, then and there feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought did shoot off, to, against and upon the said Noah Frazier; and that the said Brainerd Marshall with the leaden bullet aforesaid out of the gun by the said Brainerd Marshall discharged and shot off as aforesaid then and there feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought did strike, penetrate and wound the said Noah Frazier in and upon the right arm and side; giving to him, the said Noah Frazier then and there with the leaden bullet aforesaid as aforesaid discharged and shot out of the gun aforesaid by the said Brainerd Marshall in and upon the right arm and side of him, the said Noah Frazier, one mortal wound; of which mortal wound, he, the said Noah Frazier, shortly thereafter and on the same day died. AND SO THE JURORS AFORESAID upon their oaths aforesaid do say that the said Brainerd Marshall, him the said Noah Frazier, in the manner and by the means aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought did kill and murder against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

This indictment is found on the testimony of Dr. A. L. Hummel

J. M. Rindley, C. L. Marshall, E. B. Crossman, J. D. Bateman witnesses
Samuel Chifflett
sworn in Court and sent before the grand jury to give evidence.

Nov. Term, 1917

Com

Prison and Marshall

For a Felony

a True Bill

to J. H. Haddock

for murder

As my father
Com. atty.

The Jurors of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in and for the County of Rockingham, do hereby certify that the Grand Jury of said County, at its March term, 1917, upon their oath prescribed, that certain parcels on the twenty-fifth day of March in the year 1917, in the said County, with force and arms, in the presence of the body of one John Prater, in the possession of the said Commonwealth, feloniously, wilfully and unlawfully, with intent to kill, shot and killed the said John Prater, a Winchester repeating rifle, which said rifle was in the hands of the said John Prater at the time of the shooting, and that the said John Prater was shot and killed with the loaded bullet stored out of the magazine of the said Winchester repeating rifle and shot all an above the head of the said John Prater, wilfully and of his malice aforethought, penetrate and wound the said John Prater in and upon the right side and side; giving to him, the said John Prater then and there with the loaded bullet stored in the magazine of the said Winchester repeating rifle and shot out of the gun stored by the said John Prater in and upon the right side and side of his, the said John Prater, one mortal wound; of which mortal wound, he, the said John Prater, shortly thereafter and on the next day died. The said John Prater, his said John Prater, in the manner and by the means aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought did kill and murder against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

This indictment is found on the testimony of J. H. Haddock, witness.

Sworn in Court and sent before the Grand Jury to give evidence.

Commonwealth of Virginia,
County of Rockingham, to-wit:

In the Circuit Court of said County:

The jurors of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in and for the
body of the County of Rockingham, and now attending the Circuit
Court of said county, UPON THEIR OATHS PRESENT, that

against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

AND THE JURORS AFORESAID, UPON THEIR OATHS AFORESAID, DO
FURTHER PRESENT, that

against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

This indictment is found on the testimony of _____

_____ .
witnesses sworn in Court and sent before the Grand Jury to give
evidence.

The jury find the prisoner ~~guilty~~ Brainerd
Marshall guilty of voluntary manslaughter as
charged in the indictment, and fix his punishment
at confinement in the penitentiary for one
year

J. L. Leeth Foreman

March term, 1917.

COMMONWEALTH

vs. Indictment

Brainerd Marshall

For Felony

For Misdemeanor

A TRUE BILL.

H. Z. Madrick
Foreman

Placed
not being

HARRY M. STRICKLER
Com. Atty.