

History of Congress



Gen.
Exhibit A



Com.

40

"Exhibit B"



Ann.

Exhibit 2



Brink Ex-D

Arrest Warrant

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, } TO WIT:
ROCKINGHAM COUNTY, }

To W. E. Lucena Deputy Sheriff, a Constable of said County:

Whereas, Dexon Louis of the said County, has this day made complaint and information on oath before me, J. H. Bruce a Justice of the said County,

that Eed Shiflett of the said County, on the 29 day of May 1927, in the said County, did

unlawfully with force & threat did unlawfully & feloniously slash with a knife and take one Dook Warrson

These are therefore, in the name of the Commonwealth of Virginia, to command you forthwith to apprehend and bring before me, or some other Justice of the said County, the body of the said

Eed Shiflett to answer the said complaint and to be further dealt with according to law. And you are required to summon

to appear and give evidence in behalf of the Commonwealth, on the examination touching the said offence.

Given under my hand and seal this 29 day of May, in the year 1927.

J. H. Bruce J. P. (Seal)

Edd Shiplatt alias
Edd Hester being
brought before and on the
hearing of evidence
considered by N. Bruce
a Justice in and
for the County of
Rockingham being
the Defendant to
County Jail to
be dealt for the
with as County
Law.

May 29 1927

Cash 0
Arrest 100
Fines 390
m 400
N. Bruce J.

Commonwealth

vs. } Arrest Warrant

Edd Shiplatt
alias Edd Hester

Executed the within warrant by arresting
and delivering the body of

before

a Justice of Rockingham County, and by am-
mouncing the within named witness in person.

this day of 19

Constable of Rockingham County.

D. Swank

J. N. "

W. H. Hall

J. B. Miller

C. S. Wenger

J. W. Myers

June Term

1921

ED. SHIPLETT

Upon an Indictment

ADS for a Felony

COMMONWEALTH

June Term

1921

Cont.

75 -

W. S. Burner	2.70
W. B. Fahmy	3.50
Virgil Hawse	1.50
E. L. Fletcher	1.50
G. L. Gooden	3.50
J. N. Swank	1.50
Chas Brocke	1.50
Wm Sweetser	2.70
W. N. Payrode	3.00
W. R. Fultcher	1.80
Ernest F. Myers	2.10
Jno. H. Oliver	2.10

15
130
120
180
54.20
22.50

867.0

Instruction No. 2

Malice aforethought is any formed design of doing mischief, whether arising from hatred and revenge against the deceased, or from a perverse malignity and depravity of the heart in general.

It means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. If one gives a perfect stranger a blow likely to produce death, he does it of malice because he does it intentionally without just cause or excuse. If one ^{steals} ~~steals~~ cattle without knowing whose they are, if he poisons a fishery without knowing the owner, he does it of malice, because it is a wrongful act and done intentionally.

Handwritten signature

Makes a statement in any form of doing anything
whether arising from habit and routine against the demand, or from
a genuine indignity and depravity of the heart in general.
It means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause
or excuse. It one gives a general answer a plea likely to protect
himself from it or make himself secure he does so intentionally without
just cause or excuse. It one makes a plea without making a plea that
he will be present a plea without knowing the facts, he does it
because he is a wrongful act and done intentionally.

Instruction No. 7.

Every unlawful homicide must be either murder or manslaughter, and whether it be ^{the} one or the other depends upon the means by which it was accomplished and on whether the person who perpetrated it did it with malice or not. If the act was done with a deadly weapon, or by means likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, and with malice, it is murder. If done in the heat of a sudden passion arising on sufficient provocation, or in the heat of mutual combat, it is voluntary manslaughter. If it be done in the commission of an unlawful act not felonious, by a means not likely and not intended to cause death or great bodily harm, it is involuntary manslaughter.

Instruction No. _____

Malice or malice aforethought is any formed design of doing mischief, whether arising from a feeling of hatred or revenge against the deceased or from wickedness of the heart in general.

Instruction No.

Murder is distinguished by the law into murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree.

Instruction No. 4

Every individual should be either under
of regulation, and when it is not in the other
from the fact of this it was completed and in
the fact of the regulation it is in the other
if the fact of this is a health regulation, it is
to be made with an effective date, and also
in fact. It is in the fact of a health regulation
on the fact of regulation, or in the fact of
to be made with an effective date. It is in the
fact of the regulation, or in the fact of
to be made with an effective date. It is in the
fact of the regulation, or in the fact of
to be made with an effective date.

Instruction No. 5

Every individual should be either under
of regulation, and when it is not in the other
from the fact of this it was completed and in
the fact of the regulation it is in the other
if the fact of this is a health regulation, it is
to be made with an effective date, and also
in fact. It is in the fact of a health regulation
on the fact of regulation, or in the fact of
to be made with an effective date. It is in the
fact of the regulation, or in the fact of
to be made with an effective date. It is in the
fact of the regulation, or in the fact of
to be made with an effective date.

Instruction No. 3

Murder is distinguished by the Law into murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree. Murder which is perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, starving, or any other wilful, deliberate and premeditated murder, is murder in the first degree; all other murder is murder in the second degree.

Instruction No. 4

Every unlawful homicide is presumptively murder in the second degree. In order to elevate the offense to murder in the first degree the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove the characteristics of that offense beyond all reasonable doubt; and to reduce the offense to manslaughter, the burden is upon the accused.

Instruction No. 5

To constitute a wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, it is not necessary that the intention to kill should exist any particular length of time prior to the doing of the deed. Such intention may come into existence for the first time at the time of the killing.

Exhibit No. 3

Memorandum in support of the case of the State of New York
in the case of the State of New York and the State of New York

Under this is presented to the court, in support of the case of the State of New York, the following facts, which are true and correct to the best of the knowledge and belief of the undersigned, and which are true and correct to the best of the knowledge and belief of the undersigned.

Exhibit No. 4

Under this is presented to the court, in support of the case of the State of New York, the following facts, which are true and correct to the best of the knowledge and belief of the undersigned, and which are true and correct to the best of the knowledge and belief of the undersigned.

Exhibit No. 5

Under this is presented to the court, in support of the case of the State of New York, the following facts, which are true and correct to the best of the knowledge and belief of the undersigned, and which are true and correct to the best of the knowledge and belief of the undersigned.

Instruction No. 6

The Court instructs the jury that where a homicide has been committed with a deadly weapon the law implies malice from the use of such weapon and a man must be taken to intend that which he does or which is the immediate or ~~probable~~ ^{probable} ~~necessary~~ consequence of his act.

Instruction No. 7

The Court instructs the jury that a reasonable doubt is such doubt as may be honestly and reasonably entertained as to some substantial and material fact essential to the proof of the offense charged. A reasonable doubt must be based upon the evidence or be such as is suggested by the evidence or grows out of the evidence itself, or out of the absence of material evidence. It must not be an arbitrary doubt. It must be serious and substantial in order to warrant an acquittal. It must be a doubt of a material fact or of material facts necessary to be believed by the jury in order to find a verdict of conviction, and not of immaterial and unnecessary circumstances.

Handwritten text at the top of the page, possibly a name or title.

The Court instructs the jury that where a defendant
has been identified with a specific person the fact that
the defendant was seen at the scene of the crime is
evidence that tends to show or prove in the absence of
other evidence the guilt of the defendant.

Handwritten text in the middle of the page, possibly a name or title.

The Court instructs the jury that a reasonable
doubt is that doubt which may be honestly and reasonably
entertained as to some substantial fact which is
essential to the guilt of the defendant. A reasonable
doubt may be based upon the evidence or it may be
based upon the evidence or some other fact which is
essential to the guilt of the defendant. It must not be
an arbitrary doubt. It must be based upon substantial
evidence which is relevant and material. It must be a doubt of a
substantial fact which is essential to the guilt of the
defendant. It is not a doubt which is based upon
speculation or conjecture. It is not a doubt which is
based upon mere possibility. It is not a doubt which is
based upon mere probability. It is not a doubt which is
based upon mere suspicion. It is not a doubt which is
based upon mere conjecture. It is not a doubt which is
based upon mere possibility. It is not a doubt which is
based upon mere probability. It is not a doubt which is
based upon mere suspicion. It is not a doubt which is
based upon mere conjecture.

Instruction 8

The Court instructs the jury that in this case, as in all criminal cases, the accused's plea of not guilty raises a presumption of innocence in his favor and puts on the Commonwealth the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If, therefore, upon a consideration of the whole case, the testimony of the witnesses and the circumstances shown in evidence, there exists in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, they should find him not guilty. And the Court further tells the jury that a reasonable doubt is that state of the case which, after comparison and consideration of all of the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in such a condition that they cannot say that they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.

Testimony

The first witness who testified in this case, as is all witnesses
in this case, was called a juror, and he testified that he
in the first and only on the occasion of seeing his wife
before the trial, that is, that a conversation of the state
and the testimony of the witness and the circumstances of the case,
and that in the case of the first witness, he is in the state
in the witness, that is, that the witness and the first witness
tell the jury that a conversation took place of the state,
after discussion and consideration of all of the evidence, that is
before the jury in that condition that they cannot say that they
are satisfied to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.

Instruction No. 9

The Court further instructs the jury that to constitute murder in the first degree, the prisoner must have been incited to the killing by malice, and the killing must have been a wilfull, deliberate, and pre-meditated act on the part of the prisoner.

Instruction No. 2

The Court further instructs the jury that in committing murder in the first degree, the witness must have been killed by a willful, deliberate, and premeditated act on the part of the defendant.

Instruction No. 10

The Court instructs the jury that they are the sole judges of the evidence; that they may believe or refuse to believe any witness, and that when passing upon the credibility of the various witnesses they may rightly take into consideration the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their stories, their feeling or bias if any is shown, their interest in the result of the case, their demeanor and conduct on the stand, their means of information and their apparent truthfulness or untruthfulness, or any other circumstances which affect the weight of their testimony.

The Court instructs the jury that they are the
sole judges of the evidence; that they may believe or
refuse to believe any witness, and that when passing upon
the credibility of the various witnesses they may rightly
take into consideration the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of their stories, their feeling or bias if any is shown,
their interest in the result of the case, their honesty
and courage on the stand, their mode of information and
their apparent impartiality or partiality, or any
other circumstances which affect the weight of their
testimony.

Instruction //

The Court instructs the jury that, not withstanding the fact that Edward Shifflett may have been present at the time Dosh Garrison was stabbed and killed, he is not to be prejudiced by the inability of the Commonwealth to point to any other criminal agent or person who committed the crime, nor is Edward Shifflett called upon to vindicate his own innocence by naming or identifying the guilty man, but he rests secure in the presumption of innocence until proof is adduced which establishes the fact beyond all reasonable doubt that he actually stabbed and killed the deceased, Dosh Garrison, or was present and participating in the assault on Garrison which resulted in his death, and if the Commonwealth has failed to prove by clear, distinct and reliable evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that he stabbed and killed the deceased, or was so present and participating in such assault, the law requires the jury to find him not guilty.

Instruction

The Court instructs the jury that, not without
in the fact that should be considered as to whether at
the time John Garrison was stabbed and killed, he is not to
be prejudiced by the inability of the Commonwealth to point
to any other criminal agent or person who committed the
crime, nor is Edward Whittier called upon to vindicate his
own innocence by making an identification of the guilty man, but
he rests secure in the presumption of innocence until proof
is adduced which establishes the fact beyond all reasonable
doubt that he actually stabbed and killed the deceased, John
Garrison, or was present and participating in the assault
on Garrison which resulted in his death, and if the govern-
ment has failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence
that he is responsible for the death of John Garrison and
killed the deceased, or was present and participating
in such assault, the law requires the jury to find him not
guilty.

Instruction 12

The Court instructs the jury that although they believe that Dosh Garrison before his death did make the statement attributed to him by the State's witnesses that Edward Shifflett had stabbed him without cause, and that this statement was made in the presence of Shifflett who did not then deny it, *the failure of Shifflett to deny or make any answer, is* ~~this statement is~~ not to be taken as an admission of guilt by Shifflett, but it is to be considered by the Jury as a circumstance of conduct *on his part* along with all ^{the} other facts and circumstances of the case in determining the question of Shifflett's innocence or guilt.

The court... the...
 that...
 made the statement...
 named that...
 course, and...
 of...
 not to be...
 but it is to be...
 of...
 of the case in...
 introduction...

INSTRUCTION NO. 13

The Court instructs the jury that voluntary drunkenness does not excuse crime. Every crime committed by one in a state of intoxication, however great, is punished just as if he were sober. Drunkenness, therefore, can never be relied on as an excuse for murder. It matters not how drunk one is, if he purposely slay another, without other excuse, palliation, or justification than that of his drunkenness, he is just as guilty of murder as if he had been sober. There are certain grades of crime, however, which a drunk man may not be capable of committing. When a man has become so greatly intoxicated as not to be able to deliberate and premeditate, he cannot commit murder of the first degree, or that class of murder under our statute denominated a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. But so long as he retains the faculty of willing, deliberating, and premeditating, though drunk, he is capable of committing murder in the first degree; and if a drunk man is guilty of a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, he is guilty of murder in the first


degree. If a mortal wound be given with a deadly weapon, ~~and~~ without any or on very slight provocation, but at the time of inflicting the wound the slayer's condition from intoxication is such as to render him incapable of doing a willful, deliberate, and premeditated act, he is then guilty of murder in the second degree.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The first meeting of the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Executive Branch was held on January 15, 1947. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the proposed reorganization of the Executive Branch and to determine the scope and objectives of the study. The Committee was composed of members from both the House and the Senate, and was chaired by the Honorable Charles McNary, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Organization of the Executive Branch.

The Committee held several subsequent meetings and conducted extensive research into the various proposals for reorganization. It held numerous public hearings and received many suggestions from interested parties. The Committee's report, which was submitted to the Senate on June 10, 1947, contains a detailed analysis of the various proposals and recommendations for the most effective and efficient reorganization of the Executive Branch.

The Committee's recommendations are based on a number of principles, including the need for a clear and concise organization, the need for a strong and effective executive branch, and the need for a system of checks and balances. The Committee's report is a valuable contribution to the study of the Executive Branch and provides a comprehensive and authoritative analysis of the various proposals for reorganization.



If the jury believe, from the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that the prisoner gave the deceased the blow from which he died, as charged in the indictment and that though he was, at the time of committing the act, so intoxicated as rendered him incapable of a willful, deliberate, and premeditated purpose; yet if they believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prisoner, before becoming intoxicated, or while he was, though drinking, still in a condition in which he was capable of forming a willful, deliberate, and premeditated purpose, had formed a willful, deliberate, and premeditated purpose to commit murder, and that he afterward, in pursuance of that purpose so formed, gave the deceased the blow from which he died, as charged in the indictment, with malice prepense, without sufficient provocation, and from reckless wickedness of heart, then they are instructed that such an act upon the part of the prisoner, though he may have been intoxicated at the time of committing it, constitutes in the eye of the law a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, and as such is murder in the first degree.

MEMORANDUM

If the jury believe, from the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that the prisoner gave the deceased the blow which he died, as charged in the indictment and that through his act, at the time of committing the act, so intended as to produce the injury, it is not necessary to inquire whether the prisoner was sane at the time of committing the act, or whether he was sane at the time of committing the act, or whether he was sane at the time of committing the act, or whether he was sane at the time of committing the act.

In this case, it is shown that the prisoner, before committing the act, was sane, and that the prisoner, at the time of committing the act, was sane, and that the prisoner, at the time of committing the act, was sane.

It is shown in the evidence that the prisoner, at the time of committing the act, was sane, and that the prisoner, at the time of committing the act, was sane, and that the prisoner, at the time of committing the act, was sane.

It is shown in the evidence that the prisoner, at the time of committing the act, was sane, and that the prisoner, at the time of committing the act, was sane, and that the prisoner, at the time of committing the act, was sane.

It is shown in the evidence that the prisoner, at the time of committing the act, was sane, and that the prisoner, at the time of committing the act, was sane, and that the prisoner, at the time of committing the act, was sane.

Very truly yours,

Instruction No. _____

Given as mod.

The Court further instructs the jury that to constitute murder in the first degree, the prisoner must have been incited to the killing by malice, and the killing must have been a wilfull, deliberate, and premeditated act on the part of the prisoner; that is to say, he must have willed, deliberated, and premeditated that he should kill the deceased, or do him some serious bodily injury, the necessary result of which would be his death, and from which he died.

Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

The first person mentioned in the report is
 identified under the name of [redacted], the person who
 have been limited to the killing by [redacted], and the killing
 must have been a [redacted] deliberate, and premeditated act
 on the part of the assassin, that is to say, he must have
 acted deliberately, and premeditated that he should kill
 the person, or persons, named in the report, and that
 necessary result of such killing is the death of the person
 or persons.

Instruction No. 2

Given as mod-assistance No. 4

~~The Court instructs the jury that Every unlaw-~~
~~ful homicide in Virginia is presumed to be murder in the second~~
~~degree.~~ ^{is accomplished} In order to elevate the offense to murder in the
first degree the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove
the characteristics of that offense beyond all reasonable
doubt; and ~~that~~ to reduce the offense to manslaughter, the
burden is upon the accused.

Handwritten text, possibly a signature or date, located at the top of the page.

Main body of handwritten text, appearing to be a letter or document, with several lines of cursive script.

Ref.

Instruction No. _____

The Court instructs the jury that manslaughter arises from the sudden heat of the passions; murder from the wickedness of the heart. Malice aforethought is the grand criterion which distinguishes murder from other killing. This presumption of malice may be repelled by the accused where the act, though intentional of death, was not the result of a cool, deliberate judgment and previous malignity of heart, but is imputable to human infirmity alone when death ensues from sudden transport of passion, or heat of blood, if, upon reasonable provocation and without malice, for on such proof the homicide will be manslaughter.

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Instruction 11.

The first sentence of the first paragraph
 instructs the jury that the evidence
 is not to be considered as proof of the
 defendant's guilt unless it is shown
 that the evidence is reliable and
 that the defendant is guilty beyond
 a reasonable doubt. This instruction
 is given to the jury to guide them
 in their deliberations. It is the
 duty of the jury to weigh the
 evidence and to determine whether
 the defendant is guilty beyond a
 reasonable doubt. The jury should
 not be influenced by the number of
 witnesses or the length of the
 trial. The jury should only
 convict if they are convinced
 beyond a reasonable doubt that
 the defendant is guilty of the
 crime charged.

11-11-11

Ref.

Instruction -----

The Court instructs the jury that the law presumes that Edward Shifflett is innocent of the crime with which he stands charged, and before there can be a conviction in this case the law requires the Commonwealth to prove by clear, distinct and reliable evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Edward Shifflett inflicted the wound which killed Dosh Garrison, and the fact alone, that he was present at the time he was killed, is not sufficient to justify the jury in convicting him.

Haines vs. Com., 125 Va. 768

Ref.

Instruction -----

The Court instructs the jury, that, notwithstanding the fact that Edward Shifflett may have been present at the time Dosh Garrison was stabbed and killed, he is not to be prejudiced by the inability of the Commonwealth to point ^{to} any other criminal agent or person who committed the crime, nor is Edward Shifflett called upon to vindicate his own innocence by naming, or identifying the guilty man, but he rests secure in the presumption of innocence until proof is adduced which establishes the fact beyond all reasonable doubt that he actually stabbed and killed the deceased, Dosh Garrison, and if the Commonwealth has failed to prove by clear, distinct and reliable evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that he stabbed and killed the deceased, the law requires the jury to find him not guilty.

Haines vs. Com., 125 Va. 768

The Court instructed the jury that the law
presumes that Edward killed in the act of the crime
with which he stands charged, and before there can be a
reversal of this presumption the law requires the Government
to prove by clear, convincing and certain evidence, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that Edward killed and that the
wound which killed Joseph Garrison, and the fact alone, that
he was present at the time he was killed, is not sufficient
to justify the jury in convicting him.

The Court instructed the jury, that, and with intent
to kill, and that the Government has the burden of proof
at the time Edward was accused and killed, as to
not to be justified by the insanity of the Government
to point out other criminal agents or persons who committed
the crime, nor is Edward entitled to relief upon a violation
his own innocence by way of identifying the guilty man,
but he shall assume the presumption of innocence until
proof is adduced which establishes the fact beyond all
reasonable doubt that he actually stabbed and killed the
deceased, Joseph Garrison, and if the Government fails
to prove by clear, convincing and certain evidence beyond all
reasonable doubt that he stabbed and killed the deceased,
the law requires the jury to find him not guilty.

Ref.

Instruction ----

The Court instructs the jury that the absence of all evidence of an inducing cause or motive to commit the offence charged when the fact is in reasonable doubt as to who committed it, affords a strong presumption of innocence.

Instruction ---

The Court instructs the jury that the absence
of all evidence of an intended crime or motive to commit
the offense charged upon the fact in the circumstantial
evidence is a strong presumption of

the same.

Instruction No. Ref

The Court instructs the jury that although they believe that Doak Garrison before his death did make the statement attributed to him by the State's witnesses that Edward Shifflett had stabbed him without cause, and that this statement was made in the presence of Shifflett who did not then deny it, this statement is not to be taken as testimony to prove the fact of such stabbing, nor is it to be construed as an admission of guilt by Shifflett, but it is to be considered by the Jury ^{as a circumstance of conduct on his part} along with all other facts and circumstances of the case in determining the question of Shifflett's innocence or guilt.

Comm.

Edw. v. Shipplett

Instructions for
Deponent Returns
as modified

The Court instructed the jury that although
they believe that John Harrison before the death of
...
witness that should testify and should be sworn
and that the statement was made in the presence
of the Court and that only it, this statement
is to be taken as evidence to prove the fact of
...
it is to be considered as an admission
...
it is to be considered as an admission
...
the question of Edw. v. Shipplett

Handwritten notes in the top left margin, including the name "L. H. Bruce" and other illegible scribbles.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

ROCKINGHAM COUNTY, to-wit;

In the Circuit Court of said County;

The Jurors of the Commonwealth of Virginia,

in and for the body of the county of Rockingham and now at its June term, 1921,

attending the said court, upon their oaths present that Edward Shifflett on the 29th day of May, 1921, in the county aforesaid, in and upon one "Dosh" Garrison, feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault, and that the said Edward Shifflett with a certain knife in his hand then and there held, the said "Dosh" Garrison in and upon the left side of the body in the heart of him, the said "Dosh" Garrison, then and there feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought did strike and

thrust, giving to the said "Dosh" Garrison then and there with the knife aforesaid in and upon the aforesaid left side of the body in the heart of him, the said "Dosh" Garrison, one mortal wound of the breadth of about two inches and of the depth of about four inches, of which said mortal wound he the said "Dosh" Garrison, shortly thereafter, and on the same day, died. And so the jurors aforesaid upon their oaths aforesaid do say that the said Edward Shifflett him, the said "Dosh" Garrison, in manner and form aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder, against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

L. H. Bruce

This indictment is found on the testimony of Texanna Lewis, Minor Garrison, Bessie Garrison, Eleanor Garrison, and Henry Raines, witnesses sworn in court and sent before the grand jury to give evidence.

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the name "Henry Raines" and other illegible scribbles.

We the jury find
the accused guilty
of Voluntary

Manslaughter
and fix his punishment
at 4 years & 6 months
confinement in
the Penitentiary
J. H. Swank
Foreman

Commonwealth

v) Indictment

Edward Shifflett

felony - Murder

June term, 1931

A True Bill

G. R. Eastham

Foreman

D. W. Sarasin
Commonwealth's Attorney

We the jury find the prisoner
Edward Shifflett guilty of voluntary
manslaughter as charged in
this indictment and by his
punishment at confinement in pen-
itentiary for four years and six
months.
J. H. Swank Foreman

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

EDWARD SHIFFLETT

Charge to the Jury

If the jury find the accused, Edward Shifflett, not guilty, they will say so and no more.

If they find him guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in the indictment, they will say so and ascertain his punishment with death, or by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for any term not less than twenty years.

If they find him not guilty of murder in the first degree but guilty of murder in the second degree they will say so and ascertain his punishment by confinement in the penitentiary not less than 5 nor more than 20 years.

If they find him not guilty of either of the felonies aforesaid, but guilty of voluntary manslaughter, they will say so and ascertain his punishment by confinement in the penitentiary not less than 1 nor more than 5 years.

If they find him not guilty of any of the felonies aforesaid, but guilty of involuntary manslaughter they will say so and ascertain his punishment by confinement in the penitentiary not less than 1 nor more than 5 years; or, in your discretion, by a fine not exceeding \$1,000, or by confinement in jail not exceeding 1 year, or both.

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

EDWARD SHIFFLET

Charge in the 1st

Commonwealth

v.
Edward Shifflett

Charge to the Jury

If the jury find the accused, Edward Shifflett, not guilty, they will say so and no more. If they find him guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in the indictment, they will say so and maintain his punishment by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for any term not less than twenty years.

If they find him not guilty of murder in the

first degree, and if they find him guilty of murder in the

second degree, they will say so and maintain his punishment by confinement in the penitentiary not less than 5 nor more than 20 years.

If they find him not guilty of either of the

felonies aforesaid, but guilty of voluntary manslaughter, they will say so and maintain his punishment by confinement in the penitentiary not less than 1 nor more than 5 years.

If they find him not guilty of any of the

felonies aforesaid, but guilty of involuntary manslaughter, they will say so and maintain his punishment by confinement in the penitentiary not less than 1 nor more than 5

years, or, in your discretion, by a fine not exceeding

\$1,000, or by confinement in jail not exceeding 1 year, or both.

D. W. Tamm
Commonwealth's Attorney